In 2019 the population of China was 1,392,929,000 and the average age increased from 25.4 in 1960 to 38.3. Current government policy still requires nearly two-thirds of all families to have no more than one child per couple. Three centuries later the Taiping Rebellion caused another large-scale disruption of population. But the relative size of these three Chinese population groups of 160 million will soon change. China - China - Population distribution: China’s complex natural conditions have produced an unevenly distributed population. Over a 10-year period, between 2016 and 2026, the size of the population in this age range will be reduced by about one-quarter, to 150 million from 200 million. New railways and highways were constructed to traverse the wasteland, and this has spurred population growth and the development of a number of small mining and industrial towns. Today, the net gain due to favorable demographic conditions has been reduced to only one-fifth of the average level maintained from 1982 to 2000. China is by no means unique in experiencing below-replacement fertility. Taken together, the changes portend a gathering crisis. By the turn of the twenty-first century, China’s demographic transition could no longer be doubted. Similar examples include the Nian Rebellion in the Huai River region in the 1850s and ’60s, the Muslim rebellions in Shaanxi and Gansu in the 1860s and ’70s, and the great Shaanxi and Shanxi famine of 1877–78. China’s demographic changes will also have far-reaching implications for the world economy, which has relied on China as a global factory for the past two decades and more. Due to these odds, and the large numbers of Chinese parents who have only one child, the sheer number of elderly people living without any children is significant and growing. The three wealthiest regions are along the southeast coast, centred on the Pearl (Zhu) River Delta; along the east coast, centred on the lower Yangtze River; and near the Bo Hai (Gulf of Chihli), in the Beijing-Tianjin-Liaoning region. And many parents will face a most unfortunate reality: outliving their children and therefore dying alone. As Manchuria developed into the principal industrial region of China, however, large urban centres arose there, and the nature of the migration changed. For the most part, China has exhausted its demographic fortune as measured by the demographic dividend—that is, by the changing support ratio between effective producers and effective consumers. In the past decade, below-replacement fertility has become a new global reality. Population density in Shanghai, China from 2008 to 2018 (in persons per square kilometer) Number of persons per square kilometer Exclusive Premium statistic It is also due in part to a continued tendency in China and elsewhere to believe that overpopulation is the root cause of all problems. China’s increasing contact with the international economy and its growing use of market forces to govern the domestic allocation of goods have exacerbated this problem. As a result of the country’s low fertility rates since the early 1990s, China has already begun experiencing what will become a sustained decline in new entrants into its labor force and in the number of young migrants. Claims that these future bachelors will harbor criminal intentions and a propensity to form invading forces against China’s neighbors are unsubstantiated and overblown. It is the rapid development of these areas that is having the most significant effect on the Asian regional economy as a whole, and Chinese government policy is designed to remove the obstacles to accelerated growth in these wealthier regions. In 1990, China had over 750,000 primary schools. The reason for this does not lie in the size of China’s population, but in the speed with which the People’s Republic has completed its transition from high to low birth and death rates. And although the policy was designed as an emergency measure to slow down China’s population growth, and was intended to last for only one generation, the government has not yet shown the willingness, or courage, to phase it out. The aging of China’s population represents a crisis because its arrival is imminent and inevitable, because its ramifications are huge and long-lasting, and because its effects will be hard to reverse. For Chinese aged 20 to 24, that decline will come sooner and will be more drastic: Over the next decade, their number will be reduced by nearly 50 percent, to 68 million from 125 million. Great population movements have been a recurring theme throughout Chinese history. Even before the Qing (Manchu) dynasty was established in 1644, Manchu soldiers had launched raids into North China and captured Han labourers, who were then obliged to settle in Manchuria. Observers of China’s rise, when assessing the implications for global peace and prosperity, have largely focused their attention on the country’s economy, on its energy and resource needs, on the environmental consequences of its rapid expansion, and on the nation’s military buildup and strategic ambitions. China’s complex natural conditions have produced an unevenly distributed population. China’s population is likely to peak less than 15 years from now, below a maximum of 1.4 billion. The labour force and the pricing system are still areas of concern. Because the population control policy has been in place for so long, many Chinese couples, especially in the more affluent urban areas, have had only one child. However, the unregulated influx of so many migrants and the instability of their lives and work have put considerable strain on the host cities, notably the environment and public security. By 2008, that number had shrunk by one-third, to only 16.7 million. Its mortality rate has dropped to a level not very different from that of the developed countries.

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